North Dakota Law Review
Volume 62

Number 1

Article 2

1986

An Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General Concerning
Search and Seizure Law and the Exclusionary Rule
Thomas M. Lockney

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lockney, Thomas M. (1986) "An Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General Concerning Search and
Seizure Law and the Exclusionary Rule," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 62 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol62/iss1/2

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE NORTH DAKOTA
ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING SEARCH
AND SEIZURE LAW AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

THOMAS M.

LOCKNEY*

Dear Mr. Attorney General:
I'm writing to you, North Dakota's chief law enforcement
officer, to share my thoughts about the status of search and seizure
law and the exclusionary rule in North Dakota.' I hope to convince
you that North Dakota needs to do something about the law in this
area, and I have some specific suggestions to carry us beyond mere
repetition of the never-ending debate over the merits or demerits of
the exclusionary rule. Because the success of my proposal probably
depends upon its acceptance by both the legislature and the
*B.A., University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1967;J.D., University of Texas - Austin, 1970;
LL.M., Harvard University, 1974; Professor of Law and Director of Central Legal Research,
University of North Dakota School of Law; MunicipalJudge, Emerado, Larimore, and Northwood,
North Dakota.
1. I was asked by the North Dakota Law Review to write a short essay on the recent North
Dakota Supreme Court decision in State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985). I assume they
wanted something similar to my previous dissection of a North Dakota decision in Perspectives on State
v. Nagel: The North Dakota Supreme Court's Discordant Medley of Fourth Amendment Doctrines, published at
58 N.D.L. REv. 727 (1982). In that essay, I was fairly harsh in my criticism of the North Dakota
court for, among other things, its apparent result orientation, its apparent unwillingness to create
discernable rules of conduct for police searches, and its apparent unwillingness to clarify or
meaningfully enforce the rules it laid down. Since writing that critical essay, I have come to believe
that additional doctrinal analysis and criticism is unlikely to improve search and seizure procedures.
This is not because our court is unwilling or unable to analyze search and seizure law carefully. The
recent cases discussed in this letter demonstrate to me that the court is taking its fourth amendment
duties very seriously. But the results of such effort have convinced me that the whole enterprise of
regulating the details of police searches and seizures through judicial decisionmaking enforced by an
exclusionary rule is misguided.
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Attorney General, I will write this as an open letter in the hope that
you will share it with the next session of the legislature.
Initially, I will quickly review the search and seizure problem
and the debate about the exclusionary rule. I will then explain my
conclusion that the purpose of the exclusionary rule - to ensure
that police officers comply with specific limits upon the manner in
which they secure persons or evidence - is not being adequately
met by the remedy of excluding relevant evidence. Finally, I will
suggest that North Dakota create and enforce administrative rules
to regulate police searches and seizures, thereby more adequately
accomplishing the fundamental objectives underlying the
exclusionary rule.
First things first. The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in relevant part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.2
Without bogging down in details, it is fair to say that the
amendment on its face is designed to provide some limits on police
searches and seizures. Those searches must be reasonable, and, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, reasonableness
generally requires a procedure - a warrant authorizing the search
and seizure - or a good reason for deviating from that procedure.
In addition, the searches or seizures must be based on a certain
Thus, instead of another detailed analysis of judicial doctrine, I persuaded the editors of the
Law Review to allow me to offer these opinions and suggestions in this nontraditional format of a
letter to someone who is interested in improving the quality of police work and law enforcement in
North Dakota, and who might be able to initiate action to that end. However, because this is being
published in a law journal, I will offer a modicum of conventional footnotes to allow interested
readers to verify how unoriginal my ideas are. I attribute primary credit for such concessions to
traditional legal scholarship and publication conventions to my research assistant, Cory Skurdal,
who also prepared initial drafts of the more difficult and complicated parts of the essay, thereby
allowing me time to avoid all the really hard work and instead dream about a better world. Of
course, neither he nor I should be blamed for these proposals because we have stolen our ideas from
others. See infra note 44. We are merely suggesting that reform is possible in North Dakota, where
good ideas have a fighting legislative and political chance.
For those who read this "open letter" and crave additional authoritative footnotes, I offer
Professor Keyser's "longest possible footnote against the use of footnotes," which, mutatis mutandis
(please do it yourself), I incorporate herein by reference. See Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories of
Judicial Review: Some Variations on a Theme, 63 TEx. L. Rav. 1051, 1051 n. (1985). I now claim, but
cannot prove it, the longest footnote about a footnote against footnotes.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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quantum of evidence, usually, as contemplated by the words of the
3
amendment itself, probable cause.
That relatively simple superstructure of the law of search and
seizure has become increasingly complex through the evolutionary
course of extensive judicial interpretation and application. In
essence, the courts, including both the United States and North
Dakota Supreme Courts, have attempted to lay down a code of
conduct for police officer searches and seizures by implementing
the requirements of the fourth amendment through "rules of
4
reasonableness."
To assure that these rules of reasonableness are followed, the
United States Supreme Court fashioned the exclusionary rule as
the remedy to be applied in the event violations occurred. 5 The
exclusionary rule generally provides that any evidence obtained
during a search or seizure which violates a subject's fourth
6
amendment rights may not be used against him in a criminal trial.
One can hardly quarrel with the basic proposition that the
police need to be restrained in this free, non-police-state society.
However, reasonable people (and judges must of course be
included in that category) can rationally disagree about what kinds
of restrictions are appropriate. Even if everyone agrees about the
appropriate limits of police behavior, one can question whether
those limits should be enforced by excluding relevant, probative
evidence from consideration in a criminal trial. Indeed, a whole
forest of trees has been sacrificed to make the paper necessary to
print the extensive library of debate devoted to just that question. 7
It is not my intention to rehash the debate about the
3. Professor Whitebread provides a useful and brief introduction to the law of search and
seizure, which may be used to supplement my extremely brief capsule summary. See C.
WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55 4.01-4.04 (1980).
4. See McGowan, Rule-Making and thePolice, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659, 669 (1972).
5. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92, 398 (1914) (creation of the exclusionary
rule). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extension of the exclusionary rule to state and
local law enforcement officers). While the exclusionary rule appeals to violations of the fourth, fifth,
and sixth amendments, I refer to the rule in this letter only in the context of fourth amendment
violations.
6. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914). For recent views of various United States Supreme Court Justices on the purposes of the
exclusionary rule, see the seven extensive opinions covering numerous pages in the United States
Reports in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984); and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
7. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE S 1.2 (1978). Professor LaFave provides, in the parent
volume, 19 pages describing the debate on the propriety of the exclusionary rule. Extensive citation
to the debaters is included. An additional 55 pages, covering the debate since 1978, are included in
the supplement to S 1.2. Id. (Supp. 1986).
I agree with Professor Keyser's precept that "the gratutious killing of trees is an evil to be
decried, not encouraged." See Keyser, supra note 1, at 1051, 1051 n. Moreover, I extend Professor
Keyser's philosophy beyond unnecessary footnotes, and would include all unnecessary publication
for its own sake (sometimes summarized as "publish or perish"). Accord R. Lee, Statement of
Principle on Publication (unpublished).
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exclusionary rule, which, as one scholar has noted, is "more
remarkable for its volume than its cogency. '"8 Instead, let me
briefly summarize my personal convictions. My views are based
upon years of trying to make sense of the rules and their
enforcement as, at various times, a criminal defense lawyer, a
prosecutor, a law school instructor, and a municipal judge.
I think that because judges generally have such a distaste for
excluding
relevant,
probative
evidence against alleged
lawbreakers, 9 they distort or misinterpret the rules governing police
conduct to avoid excluding evidence.' 0 It also appeared to me that
the North Dakota Supreme Court, in concert with or perhaps
encouraged by the United States Supreme Court, was using
convenient "loopholes" for avoiding serious consideration of
fourth amendment questions. For example, it appeared that when
the court might have had to rule that a fourth amendment violation
did exist, it could often find instead that the defendant lacked
standing to object to the search or seizure in question.II And, if the
defendant had standing, the court could find that the admission of
the questioned evidence was harmless. 12 Other methods used by the
court to avoid questions concerning the propriety of police conduct
include: the inevitable discovery doctrine; 13 characterizing the
14
questioned activity as something other than a search or seizure;
and determining that the appropriate fourth amendment rule was
inapplicable because it was new and would not be applied
retroactively. '5
Thus, for a number of years I lectured North Dakota
lawyers and judges about the relative ineffectiveness of the fourth
amendment in North Dakota, at least as reflected in the opinions of
8. Allen, Federalism and the FourthAmendment: A Requiemfor Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 33.
9. The North Dakota Supreme Court candidly declared its distaste for the exclusionary rule in
State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185, 190-91 (N.D. 1981), and in State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d
625, 627 (N.D. 1981).
10. See Lockney, supra note 1, at 740 n. 61 (suggesting that a distaste for the exclusionary rule
may be affecting how police conduct is governed).
11. See, e.g., State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826, 832-33 (N.D. 1982) (following United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 82 (1980) by abolishing the automatic standing rule).
12. See, e.g., State v. Wetsch, 304 N.W.2d 67 (N.D. 1981) (admitting evidence derived from an
improper arrest was harmless error since properly admitted evidence would sustain the jury's.
verdict); In re M.D.J., 285 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 1979) (admitting gun into evidence was harmless
error by reason of the overwhelming evidence that the defendant committed the crime).
13. See State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 786-87 (N.D. 1982); State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d
539, 545-57 (N.D. 1981); State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185, 193 (N.D. 1981); State v. Johnson,
301 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (N.D. 1981); State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 1980). See also
Lockney, supra note 1, at 739-44 (earlier comments on our court's use of the inevitable discovery
doctrine).
14. See State v. Koskela, 329 N.W.2d 587 (N.D. 1983); City of Wahpeton v. Johnson, 303
N.W.2d 565, 567 (N.D. 1981); State v. Planz, 304 N.W.2d 74 (N.D. 1981).
15. See State v. Nagel, 308 N.W.2d 539, 545 (N.D. 1981) (rule prohibiting officers from making
warrantless entry into a suspect's home for routine felony arrests does not apply retroactively).
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the North Dakota Supreme Court. The effect of the exclusionary
rule on police conduct was, from a law enforcement viewpoint,
analogous to lightning striking - because it struck so infrequently
and so unpredictably, it was not a cause for serious alarm about the
loss of relevant evidence. 16 Just as I was developing this opinion,
however, strange developments began to occur. First, the United
States Supreme Court took significant steps to make the rules of
search and seizure less restrictive 17 and added new ways to avoid
the effects of the exclusionary rule. 18 Then, within the last year, the
North Dakota Supreme Court surprisingly found the evidence in
two criminal cases inadmissible notwithstanding relatively easy
doctrinal justifications that could have achieved contrary results. 19
In another case the North Dakota court refused to support a trial
court's suppression of evidence, a result that is somewhat difficult
20
to reconcile with a general understanding of the rules involved.
I believe that a connection exists between the exclusionary rule
and the confusion of the general rules governing police conduct.
The rules currently applied to control searches and seizures under
the fourth amendment are, for the most part, not practically
understandable by the people they are supposed to control - North
Dakota law enforcement personnel. To illustrate my point about
the confusion law enforcement personnel must feel about our
judge-made rules, consider the following hypothetical:
Officer Able receives a telephone call from an anonymous
informant. The informant states that Clem has marijuana
16. See Lockney, About Five Years in the Life of North Dakota Search and Seizure, Interrogation &
Confession and Eye Witness Identification Law, in NORTH DAKOTA PRACTICAL CRIMINAL PRE-TRIAL
PROCEDURES 1, 3-18 (1985) (brief summary of recent North Dakota search and seizure cases).
17. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (replacing the Aguilar-Spinelli "two pronged
test" with "totality of the circumstances" analysis as the method for making probable cause
determinations). See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964). For a discussion of how the decision in Gates made the rules of search and seizure less
restrictive, see W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5 3.3(c) (1984).
18. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, (1984) (officer's objectively reasonable reliance
on subsequently invalidated search warrant does not justify substantial costs of exclusion);
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (suppression of evidence not required where
judge, not police officers, committed error of constitutional dimensions with respect to issuing a
warrant); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting inevitable legitimate discovery
doctrine).
19. See State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 784-85 (N.D. 1985) (unannounced entry pursuant
to a "knock and announce" search warrant was not justified by exigent circumstances, or good faith
exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 366-67 (N.D. 1985)
(search in reliance on a tip from an anonymous informant failed to meet even the more liberal
"totality of the circumstances" analysis of Gates, and hence was not justified by probable cause).
20. See State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 876 (N.D. 1985) (stolen microwave oven was
admissible as the result of a "plain view seizure" though officers: (1) entered premises pursuant to
search warrant covering only drugs and money but were looking to find stolen goods as well; (2)
picked up the microwave to read its serial number; and (3) called in the serial number to determine if
microwave was stolen). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality)
(evidence is admissible as the result of a valid "plain view seizure" only if: (1) the prior intrusion was
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in his residence, and describes Clem's residence, car, and
place of work. The informant also states that he
previously supplied accurate information which led to the
conviction of Roy. Able verifies Clem's identity,
residence, car, and work place. Able then submits an
affidavit containing this information to a magistrate and
obtains a warrant to search Clem's residence for
marijuana. Officer Able goes to Clem's residence with
Officer Baker to execute the warrant.
The officers enter a porch through a closed but
unlocked storm door, and cross to an open doorway
leading into Clem's residence. A doorbell is located
beside the open door. Inside the door is a hall and
stairway leading to the second floor. Without ringing the
doorbell or knocking, and without announcing their
authority, Able and Baker enter through the open door.
They climb the stairs and observe Clem sitting in his
living room. They then knock at the entrance to the living
room and announce their authority. The officers search
Clem's residence and discover a quantity of marijuana.
During the search of Clem's residence, Officer Baker
observes a portable television set on a table in the lower
hall. Since he had previously been told that Clem was
near the area of a recent burglary, Baker decided that the
search might be a good opportunity for him to observe
stolen goods. Baker picks up the television in order to
record the serial number, and calls the number in to the
police station. It turns out that the television is stolen.
By using this hypothetical, we can examine the "rules"
derived from the recent North Dakota cases I referred to earlier
dealing with search warrants - a common and judicially preferred
method for authorizing police searches. 2" To help make my
primary point, however, let me summarize the rules as if I were
lecturing a class of police officers. Assume we have intelligent
officers, eager to learn the rules governing their conduct in
situations similar to those in the hypothetical. They should be very
interested to know the "reality" of the hypothetical since it is
22
actually based on three recent North Dakota cases.
valid; (2) discovery of item was inadvertent; and (3) it was immediately apparent that the object was
contraband).
21. SeeState v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985); State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779
(N.D. 1985); State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1985).
22. The first paragraph of the hypothetical is derived from State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d
363, 364-65 (N.D. 1985). The second paragraph of the hypothetical is similar to the facts of State v.
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As police officers, you must determine whether there
is probable cause to search before you ask for a search
warrant. 23 If the information that you believe shows
probable cause includes a tip from an informant, you
must exercise your prudence and common sense as a
reasonable, well-trained police officer to judge its merit in
showing probable cause. 24 The information or tip should
of
be evaluated by either the Gates "totality
circumstances" test or the Aguilar-Spinelli "two-pronged
veracity and basis of knowledge" test, since the North
Dakota Supreme Court is unsure what test controls in
25
North Dakota.
This information should then be presented to the
magistrate who will evaluate it for probable cause. 26 If the
magistrate approves your probable cause presentation, he
will issue a search warrant to you. 27 If the probable cause
determination turns out later to be erroneous the
evidence may or may not be excluded, depending upon
whether North Dakota intends to apply rather than
merely discuss the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 28 Even if North Dakota adopts the
good faith exception, the evidence will be excluded
notwithstanding your own actual or, as courts like to call
good faith, if the court later
it, "subjective"
Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 781 (N.D. 1985). The third paragraph of the hypothetical is based upon
State v. Riedinger, 374 N W.2d 866, 869 (N.D. 1985).
23. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372 (N.D. 1985).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 366. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). For a discussion of the Gates and the Aguilar- Spinelli
tests concerning the reliability of an informant's tip, see W. LAFAVE ANDJ. ISRAEL, supra note 17, S
3.3(c).
Much of the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the Gates and the Aguilar-Spinelli tests is
created by the possibility of different standards under parallel provisions in the federal and state
constitutions. That possibility is well canvassed, and created, by the various opinions in State v.
Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1985), State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985), and
State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1985). The general theories and debate about the
existence of different rules emanating from federal and state constitutions (translation: the fine
points) are extensively analyzed in a recent symposium on the topic of state constitutional law. See
The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REv. 959 (1985).
Whether such divergence is a good thing, or not, is beyond the scope of this cursory essay. My
more limited point is that the reality of such divergence in North Dakota, see, e.g., State v. Orr. 375
N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985), or its uncertain possibility, see, e.g., State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779
(N.D. 1985); State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985); State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d
866 (N.D. 1985), enormously complicate the job of a police officer trying to understand the rules. I
do not think the officer's attempt to study the over 400 pages of the Texas Law Review's symposium
would help much either.
26. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 370 (N.D. 1985).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 372 n. 5. See also State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 790 (N.D. 1985) (Erickstad,
C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of the good faith exception, see infra notes 38-40 and
accompanying text.
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"objectively"
determines that as a reasonably welltrained officer you should have known that the probable
29
cause finding by the magistrate was erroneous.
When entering the object premises to execute the
warrant, you must announce your authority and purpose
before breaking in.3 0 Entering an open door is a
breaking. 31 If you misjudge the actual entrance to a
dwelling and, for example, knock too late, your action
constitutes a violation of statutory law and a violation of
the fourth amendment. 2 Good faith in making the
mistake is probably not sufficient to avoid application of
3
the exclusionary rule."
Once you have entered the premises, your intent to
search for evidence not specified in the warrant is
irrelevant (in most cases) to the validity of the search
actually conducted if a hypothetical reasonable officer
without your intent would believe he should observe and
seize other items found in plain view. 34 In other words,
your motive to look beyond the scope of the warrant
doesn't extend the scope of the search beyond the
warrant. 35 It is also irrevelant to the so-called
"inadvertence test" for the plain-view doctrine if you had
no probable cause to look for the additional, unwarranted
items when you formed your irrelevant subjective intent
to search beyond the scope of the warrant. 3 6 Your motive
to look for other evidence, coupled with close examination
of an item, movement of the item to check for a serial
number, and verification of the item's stolen character by
a radio check of that serial number, are insufficient to
convert your action from a justified plain view observation and seizure into a search beyond the authorized
37
scope of the warrant.
Running through my discussion thus far has been
the idea of so-called "good faith." Let me summarize for
you some of the good faith doctrine. When you decide to
29. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372 (N.D. 1985).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08(a) (1974).
31. State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 783 (N.D. 1985).
32. See id. at 784.
33. Id. at 784-85.
34. State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 871-72 (N.D. 1985).
35. Id. at 874.
36. Id. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality) (seizure of item in
plain view of officer is permissible if there was a valid prior intrusion, discovery of the item was
inadvertent, and it is immediately apparent the objects are evidence).
37. State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 875 (N.D. 1985).
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obtain a warrant, and a magistrate issues the warrant,
you cannot rely on the magistrate's decision to issue the
warrant unless you are sure that a reasonably well-trained
officer would be justified in believing the magistrate's
determination was correct.38 This is assuming that the
North Dakota Supreme Court decides to apply the
United States Supreme Court's good faith exception,
which it has discussed but not yet applied as the
controlling law of North Dakota.3 9 Of course, if you are
able to determine that the magistrate was incorrect, you
should not have attempted to obtain the warrant in the
40
first place.
When you enter the premises to execute a warrant,
you must believe in good faith that you are authorized to
4 1
engage in the course of conduct you choose to follow.
But your belief must also be such that a court can later
determine objectively that you acted reasonably, that is,
based upon articulable reasons sufficient to cause a
reasonable and reasonably well-trained officer to have
your belief that you were acting lawfully. Again, this is if
the court in Bismarck does in fact decide to adopt a goodfaith exception for North Dakota.
Once you are searching the premises, your personal
intent to search for things not authorized by the warrant
is irrelevant in that it will not cause the search to be
invalidated as an exploratory search beyond the scope of
38. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, (1984) (evidence is admissible if it was obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant which was ultimately found to have been
issued without probable cause).
39. See State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363, 372 & n.5 (N.D. 1985). Perhaps the lecture should
also include a comment about the United States Supreme Court's very recent decision in Malley v.
Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986). Briggs held that police officers have only qualified immunity against
civil rights suits for illegal arrests. Id. at 1096. And, Briggs further held that an officer is not shielded
from liability by merely asserting that he believed the facts contained in a warrant affidavit and that
it was reasonable for him to rely on the judgment of a judicial officer who issued the warrant. Id. at
1098-99. My colleague, Professor Randy Lee, brought Malley v. Briggs to my attention by giving me a
copy with the following question scribbled on it:
Am I correct, for the generalities of it, to say that this case, plus JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY, leaves us in a place where the burden of BEING WRONG ABOUT
THE LAW falls heaviest on the one* who is LEAST likely to know the law's subtleties
and lightest on the one** MOSTlikely to be able to deal with them? If so, the law is a
[sic] ASS.
* policeperson

* judge
Another colleague, Professor Marcia O'Kelly, says Professor Lee is correct. Since they are both very
smart lawyers, I think you should probably bring the Malley v. Briggs decision to the attention of our
police officers and their insurers.
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
41. State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 785 (N.D. 1985).
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the warrant, so long as you didn't have probable cause to
include the items in your warrant application and so long
as another hypothetical officer, acting as you did but
without your intent, could have searched for and seized
the additional evidence.4 2 Any questions, or is it all clear?
Does this make much sense to you, as the state's chief law
enforcement officer and an experienced, highly qualified, welleducated lawyer? If it's as confusing to you as it is to me, imagine
the reaction of police officers. Perhaps I've misstated the "rules" or
misinterpreted the cases and judicial opinions. If so, I doubt very
much that adjusting my belief description to fit another lawyer or
judge's reading of the cases, even if more accurate, would result in
additional clarity or intelligibility to even a well-trained police
officer.
It seems the courts are incapable of laying down clear rules. I
suspect at least part of the reason for the problem is that judges
labor under pressure exerted on them in a criminal appeal by the
"rock" of approval for controversial and complex police practices,
and the "hard place" of excluding relevant and probative
evidence. Each decision can be criticized on several grounds. If the
search is deemed improper, the decision may be criticized as
hampering the police, excluding valuable evidence, and perhaps
even providing a criminal with a windfall: the avoidance of
conviction. Alternatively, if the search is deemed proper the
decision may be criticized as insufficiently protecting citizens'
privacy from intrusive police practices. Sometimes both criticisms
may be leveled at the same decision. In any event, people cannot
consciously and conscientiously follow rules that they do not
understand. Until the courts create rules that can be comprehended
by the police, excluding evidence as a means of ensuring
compliance is, as a practical matter, about as effective as spitting
into the wind.
I believe that we should, however, recognize that the
exclusionary rule is a necessary evil. It is evil in the simple sense
that, as Cardozo said years ago, it is illogical to let the criminal go
free because the constable blundered. 4 3 But it is necessary if we do
not want to declare open season on citizens by over zealous or
confused police officers. If the exclusionary rule is a necessary evil,
it is my view that we need to pay more serious attention in North
42. State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 871-72 (N.D. 1985).
43. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
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Dakota to the rules of conduct it is meant to enforce. And, if
lawyers and judges can't make them clear enough, perhaps we need
to look elsewhere for the creation of clearer rules. I believe that we
should consider greater administrative involvement in the creation
of rules for police conduct. Over ten years ago, Professor John
Kaplan offered a logical plan for doing just that, and it is time to see
if his proposal is workable.44
Professor Kaplan noted that:
The exclusionary rule, which appears to be focused upon
the misbehavior of the individual policeman, does not
take into account the fact that the policeman approaches
his job with departmental expectations, with his own
departmental training, either official or unofficial, and
with the fear of departmental discipline for improper
conduct. These departmental rewards and sanctions are
far more important to him than the threat of exclusion of
45
any evidence he might illegally seize.
Kaplan therefore suggests that we refocus our efforts on police
departments themselves, as well as on the individual police officers.
The essence of his proposal is that the exclusionary rule, rather
44. See Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974). In addition to
Professor Kaplan's article, which inspired my suggestions, there is impressive literature on the
subject of rulemaking by or for the police. See, e.g., Caplan, The Casefor Rulemaking by Law Enforcement
Agencies, 36 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 500 (1971); Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary
Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1065 (1982); McGowan, supra note 4; Quinn, The Effect ofPolice Rulemaking on
the Scope ofFourth Amendment Rights, 52J. URB. L. 25 (1974).
See also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 5 1.2(f) (1978). Professor LaFave discusses Professor
Kaplan's proposal under the heading "Limiting the exclusionary rule to institutional failures." Id.
at 38. He suggests that Kaplan's proposal
deserves serious attention, for it is directed toward the most desirable objective of
prompting law enforcement agencies to engage in careful self-study for the purpose of
producing clear and comprehensive rules to govern day-to-day police practices, The
difficult question, it would seem, is whether the proposal could be feasibly
implemented.
Id. at 39. (footnotes omitted). Professor LaFave's concern about implementation is not based upon a
presumed inability to fashion effective rules, but rather on the demands that hearings regarding
compliance might place upon the courts, and also on his recognition of the ability ofjudges to nullify
sanctions to which they are opposed. Id. Since I extend Professor Kaplan's suggestion by proposing
state-wide rather than department-by- department implementation, perhaps courts could make
generalized determinations that the administrative rules have adequately avoided the necessity for an
exclusionary remedy in North Dakota. SeeGoodpaster, supra, at 1100-01 (likewise proposing statewide implementation of legislative or administrative regulation). Such determinations would then be
applied in subsequent cases, leaving to individual defendants the continuing opportunity to relitigate
the question. If that modification would be insufficient to avoid the implementation problem, I
optimistically hope that the "serious attention" suggested by Professor LaFave could result in some
other device to make implementation feasible. My point in this essay, however, is that we can't be
sure until we try, and that the energy expended in the continued abstract debate about the theoretical
pros and cons of the exclusionary rule would be better utilized if focused more directly on the subject
of appropriate police behavior.
45. Kaplan, supra note 44, at 1050.
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than being abolished, should be modified so that it will be
"inapplicable to cases where the police department in question has
taken seriously its responsibility to adhere to the fourth
amendment. ", 46 That seriousness would be shown if the state could
demonstrate three things: (1) that the police had in fact adopted a
set of published regulations providing rules for proper action in the
situations at issue; 47 (2) that the officers received sufficient training
to ensure that they had learned the regulations; 48 and (3) that there

is a history of meaningful discipline against officers who violate the
departmental rules. 49 When all three items are demonstrated,
courts should hold application of the exclusionary rule unnecessary,
since the goal of adequate regulation of police conduct would be
met.

50

In essence, Kaplan's proposal recognizes that the exclusionary
rule is perhaps at present a necessary evil. But if we could be
assured of the adequacy of another method of controlling conduct,
the rule would no longer be necessary. Who could object to trying
to provide clearer and more detailed regulations of police conduct,
or to providing more adequate police training? And doesn't it make
more sense to punish an officer through significant and
demonstrated administrative enforcement of departmental policies
rather than through occasional judicial exclusionary rulings that do
not directly affect the offending officer and that provide a windfall
to the defendant?
Professor Kaplan's proposal seems eminently feasible for
North Dakota. A few modifications, however, would seem in order.
First, Professor Kaplan seems to suggest that each police
department should adopt its own rules, and should individually
litigate the application of the exclusionary remedy to the cases that
arise. 5 1 Perhaps that approach makes sense in his home state of
California, with its vast population and diversity. In North Dakota,
however, we might be better advised to treat all state law
enforcement agencies as a single entity. I see no reason for rules of
law enforcement conduct on important search and seizure topics to
vary significantly from city to city and agency to agency.
Moreover, I think it would be difficult for all but a few of the larger
police departments to realistically devote sufficient resources to a
major project of this sort. Instead, I propose that the rules be
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1050-51.
48. Id. at 1051.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 1050-51.
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52
formulated at the state level. As a mechanism for creating the
rules, I would suggest a commission of some sort. The
53
organizational format could, of course, take a variety of forms.
This "commission," should be broadly representative: it should
include a heavy concentration of experienced police and
prosecution experts, other relevant54 experts, and perhaps
representatives of the general citizenry.
Regarding the training provisions of Professor Kaplan's
proposal, North Dakota already provides mandatory training for
all officers at the state level. 55 It would be relatively easy to provide
52. In addition to making implementation of the rules more feasible for smaller communities, a
state-wide program of uniform rules of conduct would releave the court of case-by-case
determinations and permit it to find that the exclusionary rule is no longer necessary in the State of
North Dakota. See supra note 44.
53. For example, North Dakota currently provides training for peace officers and attorneys
through your Peace Officer Standards and Training Board of the Criminal Justice Training
Division. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12-62-01 (1985) (creation of Criminal Justice Training and
Statistics Division); id. § 12-62-03 (creation of Peace Officer Standards and Training Board). Rules
of police conduct for searches and seizures could be promulgated by either the existing Training
Board or a new commission legislatively created within the division, and the existing Board or the
new commission could also provide peace officers and attorneys with instruction for using the new
rules of conduct.
Whether the existing Board or a new commission is utilized, placing responsibility within the
Criminal Justice Training Division would take advantage of the Attorney General's power to make
rules necessary to carry out the powers and duties of the Division. See id. S 12-62-10 (Attorney
General's rulemaking power). Thus the commission would have the power to formulate rules of
police conduct. Any rules adopted by the Attorney General must, however, be in accordance with
the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. Id. See Administrative Agencies and Practice Act, N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 28-32 (1974 & Supp. 1985). The commission promulgating rules of conduct could
therefore function as, or function within, an administrative agency that would enforce the rules of
conduct.
If the commission acts within the framework of an administrative agency, it would have the
power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules in conformity with the statute it is administering or
enforcing. Id. S 28-32-02 (Supp. 1985). Prior to adopting, amending, or repealing rules, the agency
would have to adopt a procedure whereby all interested persons are given reasonable opportunity to
submit data, views, or arguments concerning the proposed action. Id. Thus laymen, as well as
members of the legal community, would be able to participate in formulating rules of police conduct.
Additionally, the Attorney General, the legislative council, the administrative agency, the district
court, and possibly the North Dakota Supreme Court, would all have an opportunity to review the
proposed rules. See id. (Attorney General shall furnish opinion as to legality of proposed rule prior to
final adoption); id. § 28-32-03.3(1) (legislative council's committee on administrative rules may
object to rules that are arbitrary, capricious, or beyond authority of agency); id § 28-32-04
(substantially interested persons may petition for agency hearing on reconsideration, amendment, or
repeal of rules); id. 5 28-32-15 (party charged with administering agency proceeding may appeal to
district court from decision of administrative agency); id. 5 28-32-21 (party of record may appeal to
supreme court for review ofdistrict court's judgment).
In North Dakota, then, an organizational framework already exists within which a commission
or administrative agency could be created to formulate rules of police conduct.
54. The legislature could provide by statute for commission membership just as it provides for
membership of the Peace Officer Standards and Training Board. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-03
(1985) (Peace Officer Standards and Training Board shall consist of the director of the Law
Enforcement Training Center and six persons appointed by the Attorney General). See also id. 5 1903.1-01.1 (Supp. 1985) (Controlled Substances Board consists of five members, including the
Attorney General and one member appointed by the Governor); id. S 15-38.1-03 (1981) (Education
Factfinding Commission consists of three members: one member appointed by the Attorney
General, one by the Governor, and one by the Superintendent of Public Instruction). Appointments
to the rulemaking commission could therefore be made by the Governor and the Attorney General.
Commission membership could be drawn from the North Dakota legal community and include
police officers and administrators, attorneys, and judges. I feel nonprofessionals should also be
represented. If they are excluded from membership on the commission itself, however, public input
prior to adoption of the rules is probably required. See id. § 28-32-02 (Supp. 1985) (prior to adoption,
amendment, or repeal of any rule, agency shall adopt procedure whereby all interested persons are
afforded reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments).
55. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 12-62-01 (1985).
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uniform state-wide training of new police officers regarding che
rules at that time. Special training seminars could be provided for
experienced officers.
Finally, implementation of the proposal would require a
mechanism for enforcing the rules. 56 I have no firm opinion at this
point whether such an enforcement mechanism could be set up
within your office similar to your control of jails and charitable
gambling. Perhaps the enforcement agency should instead be
entirely independent of all law enforcement and judicial entities. In
any event, I am confident that your staff and the legislative council
could create a structure for an agency that would enforce the rules
in a meaningful manner.
I am not suggesting a prepackaged, guaranteed solution to this
complex problem. Rather, I can imagine many difficulties in
getting from the proposal stage to actually accomplishing the goal.
As Mencken reportedly observed, "every complex problem has a
simple solution, and it is wrong." 57 In this context, I would argue
that Professor Kaplan's basic idea is simple when compared to
alternatives, but accomplishing the actual results might be complex
and difficult. What I am suggesting in this letter is that you
seriously consider the concept and, if you think it has merit, that
you propose legislation or a legislative study of its feasibility. The
desired result is to create an atmosphere in North Dakota in which
the federal courts could reasonably determine that, since an
alternative police control mechanism exists, the exclusionary rule
has no remaining compelling basis.
I realize there is no guarantee that the courts would in fact
modify their exclusionary rule in the desired manner. We can only
hope that the courts will be reasonable and logical. But if they
refuse to modify their current stance, what would we lose? What
can we lose by having clear, enforceable, and enforced rules for
proper police conduct? Commentators have pointed out a number
of advantages inherent in an administrative system to regulate
police behavior. An administrative system allows for flexibility and
room for experimentation in methods of law enforcement. 5 8 It
56. See Kaplan, supra note 44, at 1050-51.
57. Diligent efforts by friends, Mencken buffs, and Law Review editors (not mutually exclusive
classes) failed to turn up the source of Mencken's quoted quip. The quote has, however, been noted,
in two federal court cases, neither of which cited authority. See United States v, Michael, 645 F.2d
252, 264 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (TateJ., dissenting) (noting that "Mencken is alleged to have once said
'For every complex problem, there is usually a simple answer - and usually it's wrong' "); Hoots v.
Pennsylvania, 545 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.W.D. Pa. 1981) (noting the "profound observation of Henry
Louis Mencken that every difficult problem always has a simple solution and that solution is always
wrong"). Since neither court was more successful than I in finding the actual quotation, and since
their versions diverge, I felt justified in using a third version and thereby avoiding a choice between
"usually" and "always."
58. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 677.
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makes specialized knowledge and expertise available on a
continuous and systematic basis, assisting in the formulation of
rules and in informing a reviwing court of the facts and policy
59
considerations underlying the rules.
An administrative system would also allow the formulation of
detailed rules defining the rights of suspects. 60 By calling for strong
adversary participation during the rulemaking process, it would
preserve adversary challenges to police practices. 6 1 Continuous
reexamination of established law enforcement methods would be
provided. 62 Moreover, an administrative system can address police
abuse or harassment that does not result in prosecution, and
63
therefore is not subject to the exclusionary remedy.
Finally,
an administrative
system would permit
comprehensive consideration of criminal justice issues in their
appropriate and full context. 64 By separating rulemaking from
determinations of guilt in a criminal proceeding, the possibility of
releasing a guilty defendant would no longer have an effect on the
shape of the rules. 65 And, with fewer rules formulated on the basis
of unique facts, the rules that are established would be easier to
understand and administer. 66 Thus the law would develop in a
more intelligible pattern.
Skeptics might argue that administrative rules could prove
inferior to judicial rules. I have two responses to that objection.
First, not bloody likely. But that conclusion is based in part upon
my assessment of the rules that presently exist. Someone might
reasonably disagree with my characterization of the rules and my
judgment that they are inadequate. I would remind the potential
naysayer, however, that the court rules and interpretations would
not be eliminated, only supplemented and refined. The
constitutional rules articulated by the courts would continue in
force as benchmarks for the administrative rules. And, because the
administrative rules would be subject to review and revision by the
courts as a matter of federal and state constitutional law, 67 there
would be no lack of judicial guidance for the development of the
rules.
59. See id. at 678.
60. See id. at 680.
61. SeeGoodpaster, supra note 44, at 1104.
62. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 681.
63. Goodpaster, supra note 44, at 1103.
64. Id. at 1102.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See also N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-32-15 (1974) (party to an administrative agency proceeding
may appeal to district court from adverse decision ); id. § 28-32-21 (Supp. 1985) (party of record may
appeal to supreme court for review of district court's judgment).
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Perhaps my goal is idealistic and unattainable. If so, the
conclusions we must draw from that pessimistic prediction should
cause us deep despair about the current scheme as described in my
introductory comments. 68 What sense does it make to control police
conduct by excluding relevant, highly probative evidence simply
because officers have violated rules that cannot be stated with
sufficient clarity or detail to provide the officers adequate advance
guidance?
Summarizing the main points in this letter, I believe that the
rules of search and seizure in North Dakota are so confusing and
indeterminate that they are unable to serve as meaningful guides to
police conduct. Continued use of the exclusionary remedy to
enforce the rules is, therefore, mainly a waste of time and
resources. Control of the police through administratively created
and enforced rules should be tried as an alternative to reliance on
court-made rules. The North Dakota Supreme Court in State v.
Goehring69 recently recognized that teaching officers standard
procedures at the police academy may serve as an important check
against impermissible, unbridled discretion. 70
The main thrust of Professor Kaplan's proposal, which I have
outlined for you here, is that such procedures should be created for,
68. See text accompanying supra notes 2-7. Craig Bradley, my former colleague in the Justice
Department, recently and eloquently explained in great scholarly detail his reasons for concluding
that "the fundamental problem with fourth amendment law is that it is confusing." Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1472 (1985). Obviously, Professor Bradley
and I are in agreement on that point. His suggestion to remedy the problem is that the courts should
implement one of the following two models: (1) rely on a general rule of reasonableness rather than
trying to formulate clear rules; or (2) require warrants in all cases except true emergencies. Id. at
1481-98. I am not sure that the proposals in my letter are necessarily inconsistent with his proposed
models. But his first model, as he recognizes, would not satisfy civil libertarians without some
alternative method of controlling the police. Id. at 1501.
I am even less certain how critical legal scholars might react to my proposals for clearer, but
administratively-generated rules. To the extent they find legal rules hopelessly or unavoidably
indeterminate, they might find the proposal naively utopian. However, to the extent that they equate
legal and political rulemaking, they might endorse the open placement of control in an
administrative, legislative context. An attempt to elaborate the relationship of my comments to the
critical legal studies movement is beyond the scope of this letter. I add these brief comments merely
to hint that, even in North Dakota, critical legal scholarship is a force to be reckoned with. Even
Professor Bradley reacts by claiming an intention to strive for ideological neutrality, a legal process
orientation that I doubt would satisfy critical scholars. See id. at 1472 n. 17. I admit a contradiction
between my apparently similar aspiration and my critical skepticism about the possibility of neutral
rules, but like Professor Bradley I believe something needs to be done.
69. 374 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1985).
70. See State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882, 888 (N.D. 1985). In Goehring, a highway patrol
officer stopped the defendant's car pursuant to a routine safety check. Id. at 883. After the safety
check revealed no problems, the officer asked to see the defendant's driver's license: his normal
procedure. Id. at 884. Since it had expired, the officer ran a check on the license and found it was
suspended. Id.
The defendant appealed his resulting conviction for driving with a suspended license, arguing
that the inspection was constitutionally impermissible under the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Id. The North Dakota court, however, found the
facts of the case at bar significantly different from those in Prouse. 374 N.W.2d at 887. While Prouse
involved a random stop for the sole purpose of checking a driver's license, the officer in Goehring
testified that the safety checks were conducted according to the policies and procedures established
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taught to, and enforced against the police. 7 ' You, as Attorney
General, could then show the courts that North Dakota has and
enforces such detailed rules consistently within the general
constraints of the fourth amendment. Then you would be justified
in arguing that North Dakota courts no longer have any logical
reason to exclude evidence in the occasional criminal case where it
was obtained in violation of the rules.

by the North Dakota State Highway Patrol. Id. Since the concern in Prouse was with the
"unconstrained exercise of discretion" by the officer, the Goehring court indicated that an established
procedure for vehicle inspections might be permissible under the fourth amendment if officer
discretion were curtailed. Id. at 888. Nonetheless, because the state failed to introduce any evidence
showing what the "established" procedures were, it was not surprising that the court was unable to
determine whether the phantom procedures sufficiently curtailed police discretion. Thus Goehring's
conviction was reversed. Id.
71. See Kaplan, supra note 44, at 1050-51.

